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Following the financial crisis of 2007-2008, a deep analogy between the origins of instability in
financial systems and complex ecosystems has been pointed out: in both cases, topological features
of network structures influence how easily distress can spread within the system. However, in
financial network models, the details of how financial institutions interact typically play a decisive
role, and a general understanding of precisely how network topology creates instability remains
lacking. Here we show how processes that are widely believed to stabilise the financial system, i.e.
market integration and diversification, can actually drive it towards instability, as they contribute
to create cyclical structures which tend to amplify financial distress, thereby undermining systemic
stability and making large crises more likely. This result holds irrespective of the details of how
institutions interact, showing that policy-relevant analysis of the factors affecting financial stability
can be carried out while abstracting away from such details.
Until the 1970s, ecologists widely believed that the sta-
bility of an ecosystem was generally enhanced by increas-
ing complexity, as reflected in the presence of a large
number of interactions between species. Yet seminal
work by May [1] showed that complexity can actually
undermine stability. His analysis of a class of network
models indicated that networks with a larger number
of interactions (at fixed interaction strengths) were less
stable, inspiring ecologists to begin searching for possi-
ble new sources of stability in specific topological motifs
within food webs. In the wake of the financial crisis of
2007-2008, Haldane and May argued [2] for the relevance
of this insight to the stability of financial systems as well.
Indeed, while the pre-crisis literature in economics and
finance mostly viewed network complexity as helpful for
stability, the application of network theory to finance [3]
has made it clear that complexity can destabilize the fi-
nancial system [4–7].
However, a precise understanding of how network com-
plexity undermines stability has remained elusive. A
growing body of work [8–15] carries out stress tests on the
financial system by computing the distribution of losses
conditional upon a given pattern of shocks. To this end,
one must rely on specific assumptions on the nature of the
financial contracts and the distress propagation mecha-
nisms. Following [16, 17], here we take a different ap-
proach: Rather than trying to compute the distribution
of losses, we simply identify the conditions under which
the system amplifies shocks. This allows to abstract from
details on the nature of financial contracts.
In this paper we point out the existence of two general
mechanisms that strongly influence the stability of finan-
cial networks. In particular, we show that two processes
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that increase the interaction between banks – market in-
tegration, which enlarges the number of banks partici-
pating in the financial system, and diversification, which
leads to a proliferation of contracts – may lead to in-
stability. Moreover, we show how such instability is as-
sociated with the emergence in the network of specific
cyclic structures, which amplify financial distress. There
are different types of connections between financial in-
stitutions, both direct such as interbank loans and indi-
rect such as exposures to common assets [17–19]. Our
results are derived in the context of systemic risk emerg-
ing from networks of direct exposures between finan-
cial institutions (in the following, “banks” for brevity),
which are modelled as directed weighted networks [20–23]
and which pose significant scientific challenges and comes
with prominent policy and societal implications [24].
RESULTS
Interbank network
While many factors drive systemic risk, the literature
has identified two main channels for the propagation of
financial distress through direct exposures. The first is
known as illiquidity contagion: If banks anticipate that
their counterparties may incur losses, they will try to
withdraw their liquid funds from them [25, 26], induc-
ing them, in turn, to withdraw their funds from their
own counterparties. Therefore, distress propagates from
lenders to borrowers as their liquidity decreases. The
second channel is the deterioration of interbank assets:
lenders may reassess the value of their claims towards
their borrowers under distress by taking into account the
possibility that borrowers might default, and therefore
might not be able to meet their obligations. This im-
pacts the balance sheet of the lender, in which assets
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2corresponding to interbank loans will decrease in value.
Such accounting practice, called marking-to-market, is
enforced by regulatory authorities for certain classes of
interbank obligations. In this context, the devaluation of
assets effectively generates losses for lenders, which can in
turn be transmitted to their creditors [11, 27, 28]. Since
the process of illiquidity contagion is essentially driven
by the anticipation of the potential interbank asset dete-
rioration, here we focus on the latter mechanism only, in
line with most of the previous literature [21, 22, 27].
Notice that most works based on the pioneering model
of Eisenberg-Noe [27] conclude that contagion through
the network of interbank exposures would be empirically
very small [18, 29]. However, it has been shown that two
assumptions in the modelling framework of Eisenberg-
Noe imply by construction that interbank contagion has
to be very small [30]: the fact that only the event of
default affects the value of the obligation and the fact
that all remaining assets of defaulting banks are recov-
ered fully and immediately. Indeed, two reasons for why
networks of direct exposures can still be important have
been discussed in the literature. The first is the fact
that counterparty default risk can amplify the so-called
“balance-sheet contagion” [31] due to overlapping port-
folios [32]. The second reason is that “declines in credit
quality can propagate losses well before any node has
failed” [29], as indeed modelled in a growing strand of
work [11, 13, 14, 33]. This argument finds empirical sup-
port in [34], in which it is estimated that two thirds of
the losses related to counterparty risk are due to mark-
to-market devaluation of assets and one third to defaults.
The equity E of a bank, i.e. the difference between its
total assets and liabilities, is an important variable in
determining the financial health of a bank. In the liter-
ature on financial contagion [11, 27, 28], a bank defaults
as soon as its equity becomes negative, as it is unlikely
that it will be able to repay its debts in full. The ra-
tio between total assets and equity is called leverage and
it is a coarse estimate of the riskiness of a bank, as it
is related to the maximum loss on the assets that can
be absorbed by the equity of the bank. While leverage
is usually understood as a single number for each bank,
the notion has been recently extended into the concept
of leverage matrix [13], whereby leverage is computed
with respect to each specific asset class or counterparty.
In particular, for a system of n banks here we consider
the n × n interbank leverage matrix Λ, whose elements
Λij are equal to the ratio between the nominal expo-
sure of bank i towards bank j and the equity of bank i.
The total interbank leverage of bank i is simply equal to
`i =
∑
j Λij . In fact, we will consider an adjusted inter-
bank leverage matrix Λˆij = Λij (1− ρj), where ρj is the
recovery rate of bank j, i.e. the fraction of its interbank
assets recovered by creditors in case of default. Finally,
let us denote the relative equity loss of bank i at time t
as hi(t) = (Ei(0)− Ei(t))/Ei(0).
Starting from basic principles of financial accounting
and under mild assumptions on the type of financial con-
tracts among banks, we show that the relative equity
loss of bank i can be written as a function of the rel-
ative equity loss of its counterparties and of the lever-
age matrix Λij , according to the following dynamics:
hi(t + 1) = hi(1) +
∑
j Λˆijp(hj(t)), where p is the de-
fault probability of counterparty j as a function of its
relative equity loss (see Supplementary Methods for the
details). We now briefly argue that it is reasonable to
assume that default probabilities are convex functions of
the relative equity loss. In fact, the probability of default
will be barely affected by small equity losses (as those due
to daily fluctuations), while when a bank is close to de-
fault, even a small increment in equity losses can make
a huge difference. This additional assumption allows us
to characterise the stability of the system in terms of
λˆmax and λ˜max, the largest eigenvalues of the matrices
Λˆ and Λ˜, where Λ˜ij = Λˆijp
′
j(0). Since λ˜max ≤ λˆmax,
we have three possible regimes: if λˆmax < 1 the system
is stable, if 1 < λ˜max the system is unstable, while if
λ˜max < 1 < λˆmax the system could be either stable or
unstable (see Supplementary Methods for a full proof).
We note that the instability criterion depends on default
probabilities, while the stability criterion does not, which
is accordance with the following intuition: it is always
possible to make a financial system stable by having prob-
abilities of default that increase slowly enough as equity
losses increase.
Despite the considerable body of work on financial con-
tagion, since there is no simple relationship between the
topology of a network and λmax, the study of stability
has been seldom carried out in this context. Notable ex-
ceptions are Ref. [16], in which the stability analysis of
the Furfine algorithm [28] applied to the US CDS market
has been conducted, and Ref. [17], in which the stability
of bipartite networks of overlapping portfolios has been
probed through a mapping of the contagion dynamics
onto a branching process. By building on these previous
analysis, here we quantify the importance of cycles, and
we highlight the existence of general mechanisms that
might lead to the emergence of instability in the network
of mutual exposures between banks.
Our starting point is the definition of pathway towards
instability as a sequence of networks (represented here
by their weighted adjacency matrices) Λ(0),Λ(1), . . . ,Λ(k)
such that i) the dynamics corresponding to Λ(0) is stable
for all choices of probabilities of default, ii) there exist
at least one choice of probabilities of default such that
the dynamics corresponding to Λ(k) is unstable, and iii)
the average interbank leverage is the same for all the net-
works in the sequence. That the average interbank lever-
age does not change rules out trivial pathways towards
instability; in fact, in the absence of such constraint, it
would be easy to build sequences of interbank leverage
matrices with larger and larger weights. The aforemen-
tioned stability criteria provide a simple way to check
if a sequence of networks is a pathway towards instabil-
ity: if will suffice to check that the largest eigenvalue of
3Λˆ(0) is smaller than one and that the largest eigenvalue
of Λˆ(k) is larger than one. Basing upon the definition of
pathway towards instability, here we show two important
effects pertaining financial instability that had remained
uncovered so far and could have profound policy impli-
cations. First, even if the individual leverage of banks
does not increase, a financial system can turn from sta-
ble to unstable as the number of banks increases (i.e. the
number of nodes in the network grows larger) like during
a process of market integration. Second, even if the in-
dividual leverage of banks does not increase, a financial
system can become unstable as the number of contracts
among banks increases (i.e. the number of edges in the
network increases) like during a process of risk diversifica-
tion. Notably, in both cases instability appears despite
the fact that the assessment that each bank makes of
its own risk profile does not change, because individual
leverage levels remain constant. This means that market
integration and risk diversification can make the system
as a whole unstable. These results do not imply that
such processes are detrimental per se, but that financial
policies focusing only on individual banks, also known
as micro-prudential policies, can have the opposite effect
of increasing financial instability if they do not consider
the system as a whole. As it will be clear further be-
low, the origin of instability lies in the fact that in both
processes banks get increasingly involved in multiple cy-
cles (i.e. closed chains) of contracts. Our results suggest
to include the eigenvalue analysis of the leverage matrix
among the tools to monitor financial stability.
Emergence of instability
In order to keep the notation agile, in the remainder
of the paper we set recovery rates equal to zero, so that
Λ = Λˆ. If recovery rates are strictly larger than zero one
simply has to compute λˆmax instead of λmax. The relation
between λmax and interbank leverage across banks be-
comes simple if all banks have the same interbank lever-
age or if the interbank network is a large Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
graph [35]. In the first case, via the Perron-Frobenius
theorem, λmax is bounded by the smallest and largest
sum over the columns of the interbank leverage matrix,
i.e. precisely by the smallest and largest interbank lever-
ages. Hence, if all banks have the same interbank lever-
age `, it must be also equal to λmax. The second case is
similar to the May-Wigner theorem about the instability
of model ecosystems [1] in which species interact through
a large Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph. The main difference is that
in our case interactions between banks are described by
the leverage matrix Λ, which is non-negative, while the
interactions between species in ecosystems are described
by a matrix whose elements can have unspecified sign. In
the Supplementary Methods we prove that, for n → ∞,
in this case λmax → ` =
∑
i `i/n =
∑
i,j Λij/n, the aver-
age interbank leverage across banks. Therefore, in both
cases the system is unstable whenever ` > 1.
When relaxing either of the two assumptions (homo-
geneity of leverage, or large size together with random-
ness of the graph), finer details of the network structure
become important. For instance, because the theorem
only holds in the limit of large size graphs, there exist
small Erdo˝s-Renyi graphs that are stable although they
have ` > 1. An example of a small size network that
is extremely important for policy is the the network of
the Global Systemically Important Banks [36], compris-
ing about 30 banks. Let us suppose to start from a small
and stable Erdo˝s-Renyi graph with ` > 1 and to connect
more banks to the network (by keeping ` and the number
of contracts per bank constant). Eventually, the system
will grow large enough to become unstable because the
theorem will have to hold in the limit of large graphs
(see Supplementary Figure 1 for an example). This is an
example of a previously unreported phenomenon that we
call pathways to instability , i.e. the existence of trajecto-
ries in the space of graphs along which financial networks
turn from stable to unstable, although at each point along
the trajectory the system satisfies a global constraint on
the average interbank leverage. While the theorem above
guarantees the existence of pathways towards instability
only for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs, one can perform numer-
ical experiments to investigate additional topologies as
well [37–39]. In analogy with Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs, one
starts with stable graphs with ` > 1, increases the num-
ber of banks by keeping both the topology and the av-
erage interbank leverage constant, and checks if at the
end of the process the graphs become unstable. In Sup-
plementary Figures 2, 3, and 4 we show that pathways
towards instability exist also for regular random graphs,
scale-free graphs, and core-periphery graphs. The last ex-
ample is especially relevant, as empirical studies [40, 41]
have found real interbank networks to be compatible with
the core-periphery topology. Therefore, we build realistic
models of interbank networks by generating random core-
periphery graphs using the parameters in [41]. However,
interbank exposures are confidential and usually avail-
able only to regulators. The information that is publicly
available is, for each bank, the total amount of interbank
assets and the total amount of interbank liabilities. In
order to cope with this problem, several techniques that
allow to reconstruct exposures based on the limited pub-
licly available information have been developed [42–44].
In particular, we reconstruct interbank exposures using
the RAS algorithm [45], which assigns exposures so that,
for each bank, the total interbank assets and the total in-
terbank liabilities match the values reported in their bal-
ance sheets (see Supplementary Methods for additional
details).
In general, the system is unstable if and only if there
exists an unstable strongly connected component (i.e. a
directed subgraph in which each node is reachable in-
directly by any other). The Perron-Frobenius theorem
only guarantees that the largest eigenvalue of a strongly
connected component is between the minimum and the
maximum interbank leverage across banks. Hence, a suf-
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Figure 1. Illustrative stability analysis of two paradigmatic interbank network architectures. The example in a is
a “butterfly” graph, while the example in b has a core-periphery topology: nodes 1, 2, 3 and 4 form a complete core, with the
remaining nodes having either only incoming or outgoing edges to the core. For simplicity we set all non-zero elements of the
interbank leverage matrix equal to ω, implying that the largest single exposure policy is implemented whenever ω < 1. In c and
d we plot the average interbank leverage (blue line) and λmax, the largest eigenvalue of the interbank leverage matrix (red line)
corresponding to a and b respectively, as functions of the parameter ω. The blue region corresponds to an average interbank
leverage smaller than one, the yellow region to the largest single exposure smaller than the corresponding equity, while the
unstable region is highlighted in red. In both cases there exists a region (shadowed in the figure) in which the following three
properties hold: the average interbank leverage is larger than one, the largest single exposure is smaller than the corresponding
equity, and yet the network is unstable. Slight modifications of the above examples can also account for tighter constraints on
the largest single exposure. For example, even requiring that the largest single exposure is smaller than 15% of the equity (as
requested in Ref. [46] is not enough to avoid instability in a core-periphery topology with eight nodes in the core.
ficient condition for instability (stability) is that the in-
terbank leverage of all banks is larger (smaller) than one.
However, for the years from 2008 to 2013, the small-
est interbank leverage of European banks is very close
to zero, while the 95th percentile of its distribution is
between 2.5 and 6, meaning that the Perron-Frobenius
bounds are not informative enough on the largest eigen-
value, and we need to look more closely at the topology of
the network. For instance, for graphs without cycles (i.e.
directed acyclic graphs, DAGs) λmax is always equal to
zero, implying that the presence of cycles is a necessary
condition for instability (although not sufficient). Intu-
itively, a cycle amplifies distress propagation if the prod-
uct of the weights of its edges is larger than one (we refer
to this as an individually unstable cycle). Interestingly,
a policy recommendation included in Basel III Accords
[46] encourages banks to have the largest single exposure
smaller than a fraction of their equity, so that Λij < 1
for all i, j. The policy is thus effective in avoiding this
source of instability.
However, the presence of individually unstable cycles,
although sufficient, is not necessary for instability. Con-
sider the two examples in Figure 1. In particular, the
second is a simple case of core-periphery network archi-
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Figure 2. Stability of the network of the top 50 European banks using data from their 2013 balance sheets.
We start from a random DAG, i.e. a network with no cycles, which is therefore stable. Interbank exposures are assigned with
the RAS algorithm so that, for each bank, the total interbank assets and the total interbank liabilities match the value in
the balance sheets. We then progressively create new interbank exposures (i.e. we randomly add new edges to the interbank
network), until all possible exposures have been created (i.e. until the interbank network is a complete graph). Every time
a new edge is added, we re-balance the interbank exposures so that, for each bank, the total interbank assets and the total
interbank liabilities do not change. As a consequence, the degree of diversification in the banking system gradually increases
and all interbank leverages do not change. The stability of the network is constantly monitored by re-computing the largest
eigenvalue of the interbank leverage matrix every time a new edge is added. We repeat the whole procedure 100 times. We
show the contour of all trajectories and highlight a few of them. The first crossing region (in semi-transparent blue), spans the
interval of densities of edges across which the networks become unstable for the first time, meaning that combined unstable
cycles appear. We can see that densities as low as 3% are sufficient to reach instability. We also plot the average interbank
leverage (dashed blue line) for reference. Balance sheet data from the Bankscope database have been initially used in [13].
tecture, a frequently observed pattern in empirical inter-
bank data [40]. In both cases, not only the largest single
exposure policy is implemented, but (depending on the
value of the parameter ω) the average interbank leverage
can be smaller than one. These two conditions could in-
tuitively suggest that the system is stable. Yet, λmax is
larger than one and the system is unstable. The reason
is that there are banks involved in multiple cycles. More
precisely, a sufficient condition for having λmax > 1 is
that there exist two integers i, k such that (Λk)ii > 1,
i.e. that there exists a bank i such that the sum, over all
the cycles of length k from i to itself, of the products of
the elements of the interbank leverage matrix along each
of such cycles is larger than one (we refer to this as a
combined unstable cycle). For instance, in the first ex-
ample of Figure 1, (Λ3)11 is larger than one for ω > 2
−1/3,
and thus there is a range of values where the system is
unstable even if the largest single exposure policy is im-
plemented and the average interbank leverage is smaller
than 1.
The sufficient condition for instability stated above has
important consequences for regulations intended to pro-
mote financial stability. Take the case of a bank having a
given interbank leverage and at least one exposure larger
than its equity. If now the bank is required to implement
the largest single exposure policy and it wants to keep its
interbank leverage unchanged, it might have to increase
the number of its counterparties. On the one hand, this
is beneficial because it reduces the exposures towards in-
dividual counterparties. On the other hand, it might be
detrimental as it could contribute to the creation of new
cycles that, even though might be individually stable, are
part of a combined unstable cycle. Therefore, a recom-
mendation that targets stability in terms of individual
banks can actually lead to instability because it neglects
the systemic effect of cycles.
More in general, increasing the number of contracts
in the system is the source of a second type of pathway
towards instability. As an empirical illustration of this
phenomenon, we consider the balance sheets of the top
50 listed banks in the European Union obtained from
the Bankscope dataset. We simulate a process in which
banks gradually increase the degree of risk diversification
by gradually creating exposures towards additional coun-
terparties. We start from an interbank network whose
topology is a DAG, which is stable. Exposures are as-
signed using the RAS algorithm [45], which ensures that
exposures are consistent with balance sheets, i.e. that
the total interbank assets and the total interbank lia-
bilities of each bank are equal to the values reported in
their balance sheets. We then create a new interbank
exposure by randomly adding one edge to the graph. Af-
ter the new edge has been added, interbank exposures
are redistributed using the RAS algorithm so that the
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Figure 3. Toy model of an interbank network that oscillates between stability and instability. Going from a to
e we add one or more edges every time, always redistributing the weights so that interbank leverages do not change. Added
edges are green, while modified edges are red. The initial network in a is a DAG, hence λmax = 0, and for simplicity all edges
have the same weight ω. Suppose that, as we show in f, ω is chosen such that λmax < 1 in d, but λmax > 1 in e. We then
have that network in b is stable, even though a cycle has appeared. The further addition of one more cycle makes network in
c unstable. Network in d becomes stable again after the addition of two edges, and finally network in e is again unstable.
network is always consistent with the original balance
sheets and interbank leverages of all banks do not change.
Hence, even though the total amount of interbank expo-
sures of each bank remains constant, as the networks
grows denser such exposures are spread across more and
more counterparties. As a consequence, the degree of
diversification progressively increases. By iterating the
steps above we build trajectories in the space of inter-
bank networks whose initial configuration is a random
DAG (hence stable) and whose final configuration is a
complete graph. We find that, not only the banking
system is unstable in this final configuration (i.e. once
its graph is complete), but actually that the instabil-
ity kicks in much earlier, when the fraction of existing
contracts over all the possible ones is as low as 3% (see
Figure 2 for 2013 balance sheets, and Supplementary Fig-
ure 5 for other years). Moreover, from Figure 2 we see
that trajectories of λmax can be not monotonic and that
the critical line can be crossed multiple times, meaning
that the system sways between stability and instability,
before finally settling into an unstable state. We note
that, while the definition of pathways towards instability
requires the average interbank leverage to be constant,
along the trajectories displayed in Figure 2 all interbank
leverages are constant. Therefore, the transitions from
stability to instability should be interpreted in an even
stronger sense.
In Figure 3 we provide a stylised example that helps
to connect such changes in the stability of the system to
changes in the topology of the network. We start from a
DAG, initially setting all non-zero elements of the inter-
bank leverage matrix equal to ω. We then add one edge
7at a time, always distributing the interbank leverage of
each bank uniformly among the neighbouring (borrow-
ing) banks. λmax increases every time a new cycle ap-
pears in the system. In contrast, λmax decreases when-
ever a new edge does not lead to the appearance of a
new cycle. Intuitively, this behaviour can be explained
in the following way. On the one hand, whenever a new
cycle appears the possibility for the system to amplify
shocks increases. On the other hand, whenever the ad-
dition of a new edge does not lead to the creation of a
new cycle, the weights of those edges that are part of
existing cycles become smaller because interbank lever-
ages are constantly re-balanced, decreasing the ability of
those cycles to amplify shocks.
DISCUSSION
By providing a simple and rigorous mathematical ex-
planation of how network effects arise our results shed
new light on the tension between the two main ap-
proaches to financial stability: the so-called micropru-
dential one, focused on ensuring the stability of individ-
ual banks, and the macroprudential ones, targeted to the
stability of the whole financial system.
We provide examples of sufficient conditions for the on-
set of instability: when banks establish contracts among
each other without taking into account what their coun-
terparties do, they will eventually become even uninten-
tionally part of multiple cycles of contracts, which alto-
gether amplify the effects of shocks. The recovery rate
plays an important role, as it impacts directly the critical
value of the largest eigenvalue. In turn, the recovery rate
can be at least in part controlled with certain financial
and monetary policies since it depends on both the qual-
ity of the collateral (in the case of secured lending) and on
the liquidity of the asset markets. Overall, our findings
suggest that financial stability policies need to carefully
consider network effects. This can be achieved by com-
puting the largest eigenvalue of the interbank leverage
matrix and by comparing it with estimates of the recov-
ery rate.
More specifically, we show the existence of two pro-
cesses that define trajectories in the space of network
configurations which drive financial networks from a sta-
ble to an unstable regime. The former consists of imple-
menting processes of market integration (i.e. increasing
the number of financial institutions) in a growing inter-
bank network with interbank leverage larger than one.
The latter consists of increasing the number of contracts
among financial institutions. In both cases the risk profile
of individual banks (measured by the interbank leverage)
does not change, and therefore the emergence of instabil-
ity is purely related to the structure of the network. This
suggests that policies targeted at ensuring financial sta-
bility by lowering the risk of individual banks without
taking into account the network effects can in fact lead
to a higher systemic risk.
Currently the stability of the financial system is as-
sessed by regulatory authorities through stress tests,
which are long procedures that last months and are typi-
cally run once per year. Stress tests are based on detailed
econometric models that require a large number of inputs
and the continued cooperation of banks. Even though
increasingly sophisticated, usually stress tests consider
financial institutions as isolated and neglect the conse-
quences of distress propagation across the network of con-
tracts established among them. Our approach is much
more agile, as it allows to gauge the stability of the fi-
nancial system only through the knowledge of the matrix
Λˆ. The information required to construct such matrix is:
mutual exposures between banks (which regulatory au-
thorities often have access to), equities (which are pub-
lic), and recovery rates. Recovery rates are not directly
measurable, but can be estimated [47]. Moreover, since
the largest eigenvalue of the matrix Λˆ is quickly com-
puted, regulatory authorities can easily analyse a plural-
ity of scenarios corresponding to different potential re-
covery rates. Finally, while our framework is currently
focused on distress propagation due to mark-to-market
revaluation of contracts, it is suitable for extensions to
additional channels of contagion, such as liquidity short-
age due to funds withdrawal. In this case, on the layer
corresponding to deterioration of interbank assets the
contagion would proceed from borrowers to lenders; on
the layer corresponding to liquidity shortages it would
proceed from lenders to borrowers. Typically, since re-
lationships between banks might differ from channel to
channel, one would construct a multilayered network [48]
with as many layers as the number of channels of con-
tagion. All the layers would be coupled by a single dy-
namics whose stability could be studied. However, multi-
layered networks often exhibit less resilience than single-
layered networks [32, 49]; therefore, as more contagion
channels are taken into account, we expect the system to
transition more easily to the unstable regime.
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Supplementary Methods
STABILITY ANALYSIS OF DISTRESS PROPAGATION
In this section we derive, under general mild assumptions, the criteria for carrying out the stability analysis of
distress propagation in interbank networks, and we show how the stability of a system of n banks is related to its
interbank leverage matrix. The first important ingredient is the balance-sheet consistency at all times t. The balance
sheet of a bank is composed by assets and liabilities. The former have positive economic value (e.g. loans towards
customers or towards other banks, stocks, derivatives, real estate), while the latter have negative economic value
(e.g. deposits, debits towards other banks). In both cases, we distinguish between interbank and external assets or
liabilities. Interbank assets (liabilities) are credits (debits) of banks towards other banks, while we call external all
other assets and liabilities. We denote by Aij(t) the value at time t of a loan from bank i to bank j, and by Lji(t) the
corresponding liability. External assets and liabilities of bank i at time t are denoted by AEi (t) and L
E
i (t), respectively.
Finally, the equity Ei(t) of bank i at time t is defined as the difference between its assets and liabilities:
Ei(t) = A
E
i (t)− LEi (t) +
n∑
j=1
Aij(t)− Lij(t) . (S1)
Assets and liabilities in the balance sheet of a bank depend on time along multiple time-scales. For example, money
borrowed from another bank through an interbank loan will remain in the balance sheet until the expiration of the
loan. Another example is that deposits (which in this context are external liabilities) might significantly decrease over
time as consumers are able to save less money or as other banks become more attractive for depositors. Over shorter
time-scales the value of assets can change because banks constantly assess their market value. In other words, banks
estimate how much an asset would be worth if it were to be sold today and converted into cash, presumably to pay
back other liabilities. Such procedure is known as marking-to-market and it is influenced, among the other things,
by considerations about the liquidity of the asset and the probability of default of the counterparty. Let us suppose
that bank i issued an interbank loan to bank j for a certain amount of money (the face value); as the probability of
default of bank j increases bank i will expect to recover less than the face value and the value of the corresponding
interbank assets in its balance sheet will change accordingly.
Here we will focus precisely on such short time-scale dynamics and on a specific asset class: interbank assets
and liabilities. Hence, the expiration of contracts (as interbank loans) will be far away in the future and the time
dependence of assets and liabilities will be due entirely due to marking-to-market and not to structural changes in
the balance sheets. From this perspective it is easy to realise that liabilities do not depend on time. Actually, the
fact that bank i might expect to recover less than the face value of its interbank loan towards bank j does not change
the fact that bank j still has to pay bank the full face value of the loan, which in its balance sheet appears as an
interbank liability.
We follow the assumption, common in the literature on financial contagion, that a bank defaults if its equity becomes
negative. The rationale is that the market value of the bank’s assets, i.e. the amount of cash that it could be made
by liquidating the entire pool of its assets, would not be enough to pay back its liabilities. This assumption implies
that balance sheet insolvency is a proxy for default and somehow neglects the liquidity aspects. In fact, a bank with
positive equity but no liquidity might default on its payments if it is not able to meet its payment deadlines. However,
missing a due payment might or might not trigger a default event, depending on the intricacies of bankruptcy laws,
which can vary from country to country. Considering a bank in default when its equity is negative also allows us to
abstract from such details.
Interbank loans are established at time t = 0, at which point in time their market value Aij(0) will coincide with
their face value; otherwise the face value would have been different and would have matched the market value. Let us
denote with pj(t) the probability that bank j defaults before the expiration of its loan (i.e. in the far future) estimated
at time t; the bank has obviously not defaulted at time t yet, otherwise its probability of default would be one. At a
later time t bank i will estimate that at the expiration of the loan it will recover the face value Aij(0) with probability
1 − pj(t − 1) (the probability that bank j will not default) and a smaller value Rij with probability pj(t − 1) (the
probability that bank j will default). Therefore, interbank assets will be marked-to-market in the following way:
Aij(t) = Aij(0)(1− pj(t− 1)) +Rijpj(t− 1) . (S2)
The time delay from the r.h.s. and the l.h.s. of (S2) accounts for the time needed for the information about the
probability of default of borrowers to be incorporated into the assessment of lenders.
The scenario we have in mind is to initially stress the system via an exogenous shock to external assets, i.e.
AEi (0) → AEi (1) < AEi (0). Balance sheet consistency (S1) implies that such shock will result in losses in equity. We
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assume that no additional cash flow (neither positive nor negative) enters the system subsequently. It is reasonable
that the probability, estimated at time t, that the default of bank j occurs before the expiration of the loan depends on
the equity losses experienced by bank j up to time t. More specifically, we expect that, as the equity losses increase,
also the probability of default will increase and, via (S2), interbank assets will be devaluated. This, in turn, will lead
(again via (S1)) to a change in equity. In subsequent rounds external assets do not change and propagation of shocks
continues only by iterating such dynamic through the interbank channel. As a consequence, two terms contribute to
the loss in equity of bank i between time 0 to time t: the loss in external assets between time 0 and time 1 and the
loss in interbank assets up to time t:
Ei(0)− Ei(t) = AEi (0)−AEi (1) +
n∑
j=1
[Aij(0)−Rij ] pj(t− 1). (S3)
The aforementioned assumption that a bank defaults if its equity becomes negative implies that the probability of
default is a function of the equity. Equivalently, the probability of default can be seen as a function of the equity loss
measured with respect to a reference point, as the equity at time zero. By defining hi(t), the relative loss of equity at
time t for bank i, as
hi(t) =
Ei(0)− Ei(t)
Ei(0)
, (S4)
and:
Λˆij =
Aij(0)−Rij
Ei(0)
, (S5)
we can re-write (S3) as:
hi(t) = hi(1) +
n∑
j=1
Λˆijpj(hj(t− 1)) , (S6)
where we the probability of default of bank j has been written as an explicit function of its relative equity loss hj . We
stress that the assumptions made so far (balance sheets consistency, fair re-evaluation of interbank assets, probability
of default as a generic function of the equity) can be considered accounting first principles.
Usually Rij , the amount recovered by the lender bank i in case of default of the borrower bank j, is assumed to be
a fraction ρj of the face value Aij(0), independent of the lender bank i:
ρj =
Aij(0)
Rij
(S7)
and it is known as recovery rate. Eq. (S5) becomes:
Λˆij = Λij(1− ρj) , (S8)
where
Λij =
Aij(0)
Ei(0)
, (S9)
is the interbank leverage matrix.
Let us now detail the assumptions on the functions pj(h). First, such functions map the interval [0, 1] into itself,
i.e. pj : [0, 1] → [0, 1], as both the relative equity loss and the probability of default take values in such interval.
Second, pj(0) = 0, which simply means that the probability of default is zero if no losses have been experienced.
Third, pj(1) = 1, which means that when all equity has been wiped out, the probability of default is one. Fourth,
pj are increasing and convex functions. The last two requirements rest on economic motivations. In fact, the larger
the equity losses experienced, the larger the probabilities of default. Moreover, the probability of default is expected
to increase only marginally for small equity losses (such as those experienced from daily fluctuations of the equity),
while, when a bank is close to defaulting (hj ' 1) even a small variation in equity can have a large influence on the
probability of default. Fifth, we will assume that such functions are differentiable in the interval [0, 1].
Since the relative equity loss cannot become larger than one and given that the probabilities of default are increasing
functions of the relative equity loss, the map h(t+ 1) = f(h(t)) satisfies the hypotheses of Knaster-Tarski fixed point
theorem, meaning that at least a fixed point of such map exists.
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Let us now investigate the stability criterion. More precisely we are interested in the condition that will allow,
starting from the initial condition h(1), the limit limt→∞ h(t) to exist and to be finite. The starting point here is the
linear version of the dynamics (S6), i.e. with pj(h) = h, for all j:
hLi (t) = hi(1) +
n∑
j=1
Λˆijh
L
j (t− 1) , (S10)
where use the superscript L to explicitly distinguish the relative loss from that computed using (S6). The fixed point
h¯L of (S10) is:
h¯L = (1− Λˆ)−1h(1) . (S11)
We will discuss later the significance of the linear dynamics, which at this stage is merely instrumental to our proof.
We now observe that hj(t) ≤ hLj (t), for all j and t. In order to prove it we proceed by induction; first, h(1) = hL(1);
second, by assuming hj(t−1) ≤ hLj (t−1), using the convexity of probability of default we have pj(hj(t−1)) ≤ hLj (t−1)
and, by using (S6) and (S10), we easily prove the proposition. Now, if the largest eigenvalue of Λˆ is smaller than
one, the fixed point h¯L will be stable, i.e. limt→∞ hL(t) = h¯L, therefore also the limit limt→∞ h(t) = h¯ will be
finite, and moreover h¯ ≤ h¯L. Assuming that shocks are small enough, the fixed point will be within the hypercube
[0, 1]× . . .× [0, 1].
In order to investigate the instability criterion let us assume for a moment that (at least) one fixed point h¯ exist
within the the hypercube [0, 1]× . . .× [0, 1], meaning that:
h¯i = hi(1) +
∑
j
Λˆijpj(h¯j) . (S12)
We can study the dynamics of perturbations around such fixed point by subtracting h¯ from both sides of (S6):
hi(t)− h¯i = hi(1)− h¯i +
n∑
j=1
Λˆijpj(hj(t− 1))
= hi(1)− h¯i +
n∑
j=1
Λˆijpj(h¯j + hj(t− 1)− h¯j)
' hi(1)− h¯i +
n∑
j=1
Λˆij
[
pj(h¯j) + p
′
j(h¯j)
(
hj(t− 1)− h¯j
)]
= hi(1)− h¯i +
n∑
j=1
Λˆijpj(h¯j) +
n∑
j=1
Λˆijp
′
j(h¯j)
[
hj(t− 1)− h¯j
]
=
n∑
j=1
Λˆijp
′
j(h¯j)
[
hj(t− 1)− h¯j
]
,
(S13)
where in the fourth line we have used (S12). From the last line of (S13) it is clear that h¯ is unstable (stable) if the
largest eigenvalue of Λˆijp
′
j(h¯j) is larger (smaller) than one. We know recall that, since pj are convex functions, p
′
j are
increasing functions, implying that p′j(0) ≤ p′j(h¯j). As a consequence, the largest eigenvalue of
Λ˜ij = Λˆijp
′
j(0) (S14)
is smaller than or equal to the largest eigenvalue of Λˆijp
′
j(h¯j) (see e.g. Corollary 8.1.19 in [S1]). Therefore, if the
largest eigenvalue of Λ˜ is larger than one, all fixed points will be unstable.
Let us now denote for convenience with λˆmax the largest eigenvalue of Λˆ and with λ˜max the largest eigenvalue of
Λ˜. Moreover, given that pj(0) = 0, pj(1) = 1, and that pj are convex, we have that p
′
j(0) < 1 and thus (again using
Corollary 8.1.19 in [S1]):
λ˜max ≤ λˆmax . (S15)
We can therefore have three possible situations. First, λ˜max ≤ λˆmax < 1, meaning that both the linear dynamics
and the non-linear dynamics are stable. Second, 1 < λ˜max ≤ λˆmax and both the linear dynamics and the non-linear
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dynamics are unstable. Third, λ˜max < 1 < λˆmax, in which case the linear dynamics will be unstable, while the
non-linear dynamics could be either stable or unstable.
An important observation of that the stability criterion depends on the matrix Λˆ, which does not contain the
probabilities of default. Hence, if we have a network whose λˆmax is smaller than one, the dynamics on that network will
be stable, no matter which probabilities of defaults we have chosen. On the contrary, the instability criterion depends
on the matrix Λ˜, which contains the probabilities of default. If we have a network whose λ˜max is larger than one, we
can always find a local deformation of probabilities of default close to the origin such that p′j(0)→ p′j(0)/(λ˜max + ),
making the system with the new probability of default stable. This result formalises the following intuition. The initial
state of the system is such that there are no losses (h(0) = 0) and the probabilities of default are zero (pj(0) = 0). If
we now are able to decrease by an arbitrary large amount the rate with which such probabilities of default become
larger than zero, we will always be able to make the system stable.
From the vantage point of the previous observation it makes sense to give the following definition. Given the
dynamical system in (S6), with probabilities of default satisfying the aforementioned hypotheses and with recovery
rates ρj , we define a pathway towards instability as a sequence of networks Λ
(0),Λ(1), . . . ,Λ(k) such that i) the
dynamics corresponding to Λ(0) is stable for all choices of probabilities of default, ii) there exist at least one choice
of probabilities of default such that the dynamics corresponding to Λ(k) is unstable, and iii) there exist ` > 0, such
that
∑
ij Λ
(k)
ij /n = `, for all k. The last requirement implies that the average interbank leverage is the same for
all the networks in the sequence. In absence of such requirement, one could easily build trivial pathways towards
instability, e.g. by arbitrary increasing the weights of the interbank leverage matrix. Suppose now that we have a
sequence of networks and want to check if such sequence is a pathway towards instability. First, we can check if λˆ
(0)
max
(the largest eigenvalue of Λˆ(0)) is smaller than one, implying that the corresponding dynamics is stable for all choices
of probabilities of default. Second, we can check if λˆ
(k)
max (the largest eigenvalue of Λˆ(k)) is larger than one, meaning
that it exists at least a choice for probability of defaults such that the dynamics is unstable. In fact, Λ˜(k) = Λˆ(k) if
we choose pj(h) = h, for all j. As a consequence in order to check if a sequence of networks is a pathway towards
instability we simply have to compute the largest eigenvalue of Λˆ across the sequence of networks.
ADDING NODES
Erdo˝s-Renyi
The crucial thereom that we will exploit is due to Silverstein [S2] (Theorem 1.2). In a nutshell, let Λ be a n × n
matrix whose entries are random i.i.d. variables with mean µ > 0 and finite fourth moment. For sufficiently large n,
the largest eigenvalue λmax of Λ is:
λmax =
1
n
∑
i,j
Λij +O(n−1/2) . (S16)
We will now specify the results of the theorem in the case in which the matrix Λ is the weighted adjacency matrix of a
random graph. We consider Erdo˝s-Renyi graphs in which Λij = CijWij , with Cij ∈ {0, 1} andWij ∈ R+. The variables
Cij determine if an edge is present or not and have the bimodal distribution ρ(Cij) = pδ(Cij − 1) + (1 − p)δ(Cij).
The variables Wij are the weights associated with the edges and we leave their distribution unspecified (as long as
the fourth moment is finite).
We start with the case in which the network is not sparse, i.e. the case in which the average degree k¯ ≡∑ij Cij/n
is k¯ ' O(n), or equivalently p ' O(1) (in the sense that it does not scale with n). Let us define the variables Xi,
i = 1, . . . n, as the sums only over columns of Λ, i.e. Xi =
∑
j CijWij . As Cij and Wij are independent, we have:
〈Xi〉 = n〈Cij〉〈Wij〉 = np〈Wij〉 (S17a)
varXi = n var(CijWij) = n
[
p〈W 2ij〉 − p2〈Wij〉2
]
. (S17b)
The next step is to compute
∑
iXi/n. As Xi are i.i.d. with finite variance, using (S16) we have that λmax will be
normally distributed with
〈λmax〉 = 1
n
n〈Xi〉 = np〈Wij〉 (S18a)
S5
varλmax =
1
n2
n varXi =
[
p〈W 2ij〉 − p2〈Wij〉2
]
, (S18b)
meaning that the relative fluctuation is
√
varλmax/〈λmax〉 ' 1/n.
In the case in which the graph is sparse, i.e. k¯ ' O(1) and p ' 1/n we know that the degree of each node has a
Poisson distribution with mean k¯. As a consequence, Xi will have a compound Poisson distribution with
〈Xi〉 = k¯〈Wij〉 (S19a)
varXi = k¯〈W 2ij〉 . (S19b)
If we now compute the first two moments of
∑
iXi/n we find that:
〈λmax〉 = 1
n
n〈Xi〉 = k¯〈Wij〉 (S20a)
varλmax =
1
n2
n varXi =
k¯〈W 2ij〉
n
, (S20b)
meaning that the relative fluctuation is
√
varλmax/〈λmax〉 ' 1/
√
n. Moreover, we can see that the fluctuation on
〈λmax〉 is of the same order of the correction in (S16), therefore we are not able to compute the distribution of λmax
in this case.
In the previous derivation we assumed that all entries of the interbank leverage matrix are i.i.d., which is not
entirely true. In fact, in our networks a bank cannot extend a loan to itself, meaning that there are no loops (cycles of
length one), i.e. the diagonal of the weighted adjacency matrix is filled with zeros. To compute the relative correction
on 〈λmax〉 it will suffice to note that if λ is an eigenvalue of a matrix M , λ− a is an eigenvalue of the matrix M − aI.
As a consequence, in the case of sparse graphs, we have that 〈λmax〉 = np〈Wij〉 − p〈Wij〉 = (n− 1)p〈Wij〉. Since for
graphs without loops k¯ = (n − 1)p, we have that 〈λmax〉 = k¯〈Wij〉. In the case of sparse graphs the correction is
already accounted for in (S20a), provided that the correct value of k¯ is used.
In both cases we have that λmax = k¯〈Wij〉, as n → ∞, but with different relative fluctuations. It is worth noting
that, when Λ is the matrix of interbank leverage, k¯〈Wij〉 is precisely the average interbank leverage `. Therefore, for
n → ∞, if ` > 1 the system will be unstable, while if ` < 1 it will be stable. However, if n is not large, fluctuations
are relevant, and a system can be stable even if ` > 1, and vice versa. We now provide an example of how adding
nodes to such a network can make the system unstable. We start by randomly generating an Erdo˝s-Renyi graph with
given p and using an exponential distribution of weights with mean 〈Wij〉, so that ` > 1, stopping as soon as we
find a stable graph. We then proceed to add a new node at a time, by preserving the property that all entries of
the weighted adjacency matrix are i.i.d. and by keeping the density of edges (i.e. k¯) constant. In fact, if we devised
a growth process in which k¯ increases, the system would trivially become unstable. We use the following algorithm.
Let n be the number of nodes before the addition of a new node i. (i) We randomly form edges from node i and
each of the other n nodes with probability p; (ii) we draw a weight from the weight distribution for each of the new
outgoing edges from i: (iii) we rescale such weights multiplying them by (n− 1)/n; (iv) we randomly form edges from
each of the other n nodes to node i with probability p; (v) we draw a weight from the weight distribution for each of
the new incoming edges for i; (vi) we rescale the weights of all edges starting from the new neighbours of i (including
the ones towards node i) so that the sum of all weights of the edges coming out from those nodes do not change after
the addition of node i. In Supplementary Figure S1 we see a realisation of such process in which both the density
of edges and the average interbank leverage are roughly constant, while λmax becomes larger than one, driving the
system towards the instability. Let us note that such algorithm is designed to keep all interbank leverages of the
pre-existing nodes constant. However, the probability distribution of single entries of the interbank leverage matrix
may vary from a step of the algorithm to the next one. We have checked that the simpler variant in which one keeps
the probability distribution of single entries constant and the interbank leverage constant only on average yields the
same results.
Regular Random Graphs and Scale-Free Graphs
In the previous section we have used the Silverstein’s theorem to prove the existence of a pathway towards instability
for growing Erdo˝s-Renyi networks with i.i.d. weights. In the cases in which the theorem does not hold we can still
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perform numerical experiments to check for the existence of a similar mechanism. The basic idea is to start from a
stable graph with average interbank leverage larger than one, to increase the number of its nodes in a way that both
the topology of the network and the average interbank leverage do not change, and to see if during the process the
graph becomes unstable. In the remainder of this section we discuss the details of the above process for two specific
topologies.
We start from the case of regular random graphs, i.e. graphs in which all nodes have the same in-degree kin and
out-degree kout, i.e. kin = kout = k. In order to generate a directed random regular graph we start by generating
an undirected random regular graph by using the algorithm introduced by Steger and Wormald [S3]. Clearly, by
interpreting such graph as an undirected one, all edges would be reciprocated (meaning that for any edge i→ j there
exists also the edge j → i). We therefore perform random edge re-wirings until the fraction of reciprocated edges
fell under a certain threshold (we use 0.5 in our numerical experiments). The next step is devise a process to add
nodes to a regular random graph such that the new graph is still a regular random graph with the same in-degree
and out-degree. To describe how the algorithm works let us add a the new node i. We then randomly select k
different pre-existing nodes Nout = {j1, . . . , jk} and, for any of such nodes, we select a random successor to build the
set Nin = {l1, . . . , lk}, making sure that Nout ∩ Nin = ∅. We proceed to add the edges j1 → i, . . . , jk → i. However,
the out-degree of nodes has now increased to k + 1. Therefore, we remove the edges j1 → l1, . . . , jk → lk and add
the edges i → l1, . . . , i → lk, so that the in-degrees and out-degrees of all nodes do not change. In order to preserve
the interbank leverages of the nodes j1, . . . , jk we simply set Λj1i = Λj1l1 , . . .Λjki = Λj1lk . The interbank leverage of
nodes l1, . . . , lk has not changed, since none of their out-coming edges where modified. In order to keep the average
interbank leverage ` constant, we simply randomly partition the interval [0, `] in k sub-intervals and assign the length
of the subintervals to the weights Λil1 , . . .Λilk .
In Supplementary Figure S2 we plot a set of trajectories of the largest eigenvalue of the interbank leverage matrix
for growing directed random regular graphs that cross the threshold between stability and instability, showing that
also in this case pathways towards instability exist.
We proceed to analyse the case of scale-free graphs. In order to generate random directed scale-free graphs we use
the algorithm introduced by Bolloba´s et al. [S4]. Such algorithm implements a growth process that asymptotically
leads to directed scale-free graphs. As a consequence, in order to add nodes to our graphs we simply need to iterate
it. Due to distribution of the degree of nodes, if we drew all weights from the same distribution, interbank leverages
would also have a scale-free distribution whose average would be dominated by the few nodes with a very large degree.
If both degrees and interbank leverages have a scale-free distribution unstable cycles appear with a high probability
and it is not easy to find a graph that has both average interbank leverage larger than one and the largest eigenvalue
smaller than one. Therefore, we tune the distribution of the weights of outgoing edges such that the interbank
leverages are, on average, the same. For example, if weights are drawn from an exponential distribution, it will suffice
that the mean of the distribution from which the weights of the outgoing edges of any node are drawn is inversely
proportional to the out-degree of that node. Every time a new node is added the weights of its outgoing edges are
assigned in the same way. However, when a new node is added the algorithm in [S4] can also introduce new edges
between pre-existing nodes. Therefore, for any node the weights of its pre-existing outgoing edges are rescaled by the
ratio between the new and the old degree of the node. Such procedure does not guarantee that the average interbank
leverage stays perfectly constant and, in fact, in the numerical experiments we observe that it weakly fluctuates. In
order to remove such residual fluctuations, it suffices to simply rescale the weights of all edges by the ratio between
the new and the old average interbank leverage.
In Supplementary Figure S3 we plot a set of trajectories of the largest eigenvalue of the interbank leverage matrix
for growing scale-free networks that cross the threshold between stability and instability, showing that also in this
case pathways towards instability exist.
Core-Periphery with Balance Sheets Data
In this section we consider a more realistic model of interbank networks. We start from the observation that
empirical studies [S5, S6] have found that real interbank networks are compatible with a core-periphery topology.
In such graphs nodes belong to two disjoint sets, the core C and the periphery P. By properly ordering nodes, the
adjacency matrix of such graphs is a block matrix: [
CC CP
PC PP
]
,
where the block CC contains the edges from nodes in the core to nodes in the core, the block CP contains the edges
from nodes in the core to nodes in the periphery, and so on. The diagonal blocks correspond to two different Erdo˝s-
Renyi sub-graphs. The off-diagonal blocks correspond to two bipartite random sub-graphs in which edges between
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nodes in the core and in the periphery are independent and occur with the same probability. Hence, for a graph of
given number of nodes, the core-periphery topology is fully determined by the fraction between nodes in core and
nodes in the periphery, and by the densities ρcc, ρcp, ρpc, ρpp of the edges in the four blocks.
We start by generating a random core-periphery network whose number of nodes matches the number of banks in
our dataset and by using the parameters estimated in [S5] for the Italian interbank network. In order to assign weights
we proceed in the following way. Interbank exposures is considered very sensitive information to which only regulating
authorities might have access. In contrast, balance sheets of banks are public, but contain only a partial information
about interbank exposure. More specifically, the balance sheet of a bank lists the total interbank assets (i.e. the
amount of money lent to other banks) and the total interbank liabilities (i.e. the amount of money borrowed from
other banks). Apart from a few selected studies on data held by regulating authorities, the literature on interbank
networks approaches this problem by making some assumptions that allow to reconstruct the interbank exposures
from the limited information contained in the balance sheets. The choice of the right reconstruction technique is
dictated by several considerations, the most important of which is the kind of partial information available. In the
case in which the topology and the marginal interbank assets and liabilities are known, exposures can be reconstructed
by using the RAS algorithm [S7]. The algorithm assigns exposures by assuming that, bank by bank, their distribution
maximises the entropy, consistently with the constraints on interbank assets and liabilities.
Generating a core-periphery graph is easy, one simply generates four Erdo˝s-Renyi sub-graph, one for each block. It
is slightly more complicated to let the graph grow while the topology does not change. In order to keep the fraction
of nodes in the core and in the periphery constant, we assign a new node to the core with probability equal to the
desired fraction of nodes in the core and to the periphery with the complementary probability. In order to keep the
density of the four blocks we proceed in the following way. Let us denote with Nc (Np) the number of nodes in the
core (periphery) before the new node is added and with N ′c (N
′
p) the the number of nodes in the core (periphery) after
the new node is added. Analogously, Ecc and E
′
cc are the number of edges between nodes in the core before and after
the new node has been added. We use similar notations for the number of edges corresponding to the other blocks.
Let us now suppose that a new node is added to the core, therefore in order to keep the density of the core-core block
constant we have:
ρcc =
Ecc
Nc(Nc − 1) =
E′cc
N ′c(N ′c − 1)
=
E′cc
(Nc + 1)Nc
, (S21)
meaning that the number of edges to add between nodes belonging to the core is:
E′cc − Ecc = Ecc
Nc + 1
Nc − 1 − Ecc = 2Ecc
1
Nc − 1 = 2ρccNc . (S22)
Hence after the node has been added, we also add 2ρccNc edges randomly chosen among the 2Nc possible edges
between the new node and all other nodes in the core. In order to keep the density of the core-periphery block
constant we have instead:
ρcp =
Ecp
NcNp
=
E′cp
N ′cN ′p
=
E′cp
(Nc + 1)Np
, (S23)
meaning that the number of edges to add from the core to the periphery is:
E′cp − Ecp = Ecp
Nc + 1
Nc
− Ecp = Ecp 1
Nc
= ρcpNp . (S24)
Hence after the node has been added, we also add ρcpNcp edges randomly chosen between the possible Np edges
from the new node in the core to the nodes in the periphery. Similarly one finds that number of edges to add from
nodes in the periphery and the new node is ρpcNp, while no edges needs to be added between nodes in the periphery.
Proceeding in the same way one can derive the number of edges to add in all blocks when the new node belongs to
the periphery.
In order to check the existence of pathways towards instability here we proceed in a slightly different way. First, we
generate a sequence G0, . . . ,Gn of unweighted core-periphery graphs of increasing number of nodes so that the number
of nodes of the final graph Gn matches the number of banks in our dataset. We assign weights to such graph by using
the RAS algorithm (see above). Second, we remove the node in Gn, but not in Gn−1 and all its incoming and outgoing
edges. This is equivalent to transferring all the weights of the other edges on the unweighted graph Gn−1. In this way
the topology of the new graph is left unchanged. Third, in order to keep also the average interbank leverage constant
we rescale the weights of all edges by the ratio between the new and the old average interbank leverage. We iterate
the procedure until we reach the initial graph G0.
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In this case we are traversing the pathway in the opposite directions, from instability to stability. Hence we only
keep those sequences such that the graph Gn is unstable. The reason why in this case we follow the pathway in the
opposite direction is that, in order to proceed in the usual direction (i.e. by adding nodes) we would need to sample a
subset of banks in the dataset and to randomly add the other banks, one at a time. However, the average interbank
leverage would not remain constant along such process. In Supplementary Figure S4 we plot a set of trajectories of
the largest eigenvalue of the interbank leverage matrix for growing core-periphery networks that cross the threshold
between instability and stability, showing that also in this case pathways towards instability exist.
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Supplementary Figure S1. Adding nodes to an Erdo˝s-Renyi graph. Example of growth process in which a stable network
with average interbank leverage larger than one becomes unstable as new banks are added to the system. We stress that the
crossing to the unstable regime is genuinely driven by the fact that fluctuations in the asymptotic distribution of λmax shrink
as n becomes larger: in fact the density of edges in the network stays roughly constant. Here the initial network has n = 20
and the weight distribution is exponential with mean ' 0.79.
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Supplementary Figure S2. Adding nodes to regular random graphs. Analogous of Supplementary Figure S1, but for
(directed) regular random graphs with in-degree and out-degree equal to ten. Here we show 10 different trajectories of networks
crossing from the stable to the unstable regime. For all trajectories both the topology and the average interbank leverage (which
is always larger than one) are constant along the whole trajectory. The initial network has n = 20 and the weight distribution
is exponential with mean ' 0.58.
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Supplementary Figure S3. Adding nodes to scale-free graphs. Analogous of Supplementary Figure S2, but for scale-free
graphs with tail exponents for the in-degree and out-degree distributions respectively equal to 2.15 and 2.7. Here we show 10
different trajectories of networks crossing from the stable to the unstable regime. For all trajectories both the topology and
the average interbank leverage (which is always larger than one) are constant along the whole trajectory. The initial network
has n = 1000 and the weight distribution of the outgoing of node i is exponential with mean 2/kout. Trajectories are prolonged
either until 500 nodes have been added or until the largest eigenvalue becomes larger than one.
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Supplementary Figure S4. Adding nodes to core-periphery graphs. Pathway towards instability travelled backwards,
i.e. from instability to stability as the number of banks decreases. The topology of graphs is core-periphery with realistic
parameters (see [S5]). Here we show 10 different trajectories of networks crossing from the unstable to the stable regime. For
all trajectories both the topology and the average interbank leverage (which is always larger than one) are constant along the
whole trajectory. Initial weights are assigned using the RAS algorithm (see [S7]) and are consistent with the balance sheets of
the Top 176 European banks for the year 2012 (source: Bankscope dataset). We have chosen the year 2012 as it is the year with
the smallest average interbank leverage (hence the year for which it is more difficult to observe unstable networks) larger than
one. Trajectories are prolonged until the largest eigenvalue becomes smaller than one. Pathways have been built backwards
for technical reasons, namely to keep the average interbank leverage constant while maintaining consistency with real balance
sheets (see main text).
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Supplementary Figure S5. Adding edges to the network of the top 50 European banks. Analogous of Figure 3 for
years from 2008 to 2013. For λmax < 1 the interbank network is stable (yellow region), while for λmax > 1 it is unstable (red
region). For comparison we also plot (dashed blue line) the average interbank leverage.
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